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Abstract
The current system of health technology development is characterised by multiple misalignments. The “supply” 
side (innovation policy-makers, entrepreneurs, investors) and the “demand” side (health policy-makers, 
regulators, health technology assessment, purchasers) operate under different – and conflicting – logics. The 
system is less a “pathway” than an unstable ecosystem of multiple interacting sub-systems. “Value” means 
different things to each of the numerous actors involved. Supply-side dynamics are built on fictions; regulatory 
checks and balances are designed to assure quality, safety and efficacy, not to ensure that technologies entering 
the market are either desirable or cost-effective. Assessment of comparative and cost-effectiveness usually comes 
too late in the process to shape an innovation’s development. 
We offer no simple solutions to these problems, but in the spirit of commencing a much-needed public debate, 
we suggest some tentative ways forward. First, universities and public research funders should play a more 
proactive role in shaping the system. Second, the role of industry in forging long-term strategic partnerships for 
public benefit should be acknowledged (though not uncritically). Third, models of “responsible innovation” and 
public input to research priority-setting should be explored. Finally, the evidence base on how best to govern 
inter-sectoral health research partnerships should be developed and applied. 
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In a recent overview,1 Pascale Lehoux and her team synthesise and extend a series of papers on different aspects of a large, rigorously conducted and richly theorised 
qualitative case study of the fortunes of five health technology 
start-ups, based on five years’ fieldwork in Quebec, Canada 
(2008-2013).2-4 They also draw on their previous studies on 
other health technologies and stakeholders5-8; on theories 
of institutions,9 business modelling,10 co-construction of 
technology11 and sociology of expectations12; and on a 
systematic review of early health technology assessment.13 
Their key messages, which are all the more poignant for being 
understated, are threefold:
1.	 The current system of health technology development is 
full of misalignments.
2.	 Nobody – or almost nobody – fully understands what is 
going on.
3.	 There is much avoidable waste.
Let us take some actors in the health technology development 
drama – whose plot turns on the societal tension between 
private gain and public good – and follow them as they as 
they strut and fret their hour upon the stage. 
The policy-maker who works for the government’s innovation 
department knows that she is operating in a fast-moving, 
capital-intensive knowledge economy. She is tasked with 
supporting technology start-ups and engaging suppliers in 
a way that promotes growth, creates highly-qualified jobs 
and makes the country more internationally competitive 
in technology.14 She adjusts procurement processes and tax 
incentives accordingly and designates a pot of money for 
“innovation,” prioritising small and medium-sized enterprises 
(which she views as a rich source of creative ideas). 
The clinical entrepreneur has an idea for a technology that 
will (he imagines) improve an aspect of clinical management 
(screening, diagnosis, treatment, monitoring, self-care 
etc). He bids successfully for government seed funding 
and generates a prototype, perhaps in partnership with a 
bioengineer. What they lack in business expertise they make 
up for in enthusiasm and confidence. Their ambition is to 
commercialise the technology, improving an aspect of care 
for patients while also making them some money. But they 
have only a hazy idea of how to bring their product to market. 
Our heroes (the entrepreneur-bioengineer partnership) 
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In a recent contribution to the ongoing debate about the role of power in global health, Gorik Ooms emphasizes the normative underpinnings of global health politics. 
He identifies three related problems: (1) a lack of agreement 
among global health scholars about their normative premises, 
(2) a lack of agreement between global health scholars and 
policy-makers regarding the normative premises underlying 
policy, and (3) a lack of willingness among scholars to 
clearly state their normative premises and assumptions. This 
confusion is for Ooms one of the explanations “why global 
health’s policy-makers are not implementing the knowledge 
generated by global health’s empirical scholars.” He calls 
for greater unity between scholars and between scholars 
and policy-makers, concerning the underlying normative 
premises and greater openness when it comes to advocacy.1
We commend the effort to reinstate power and politics in 
glob l health and agree that “a purely empirical evidence-based 
approach is a fiction,” nd that such a view risks cover ng up 
“the role of politics and power.” But by contrasting this fiction 
with global health research “driven by crises, hot issues, and 
the concerns of organized interest groups,” as a “path we are 
trying to move away from,” Ooms is submitting to a liberal 
conception of politics he implicitly criticizes the outcomes 
of.1 A liberal view of politics evades the constituting role of 
conflicts and reduces it to either a rationalistic, economic 
calculation, or an individual question of moral norms. This 
is echoed in Ooms when he states that “it is not possible to 
discuss the politics of global health without discussing the 
normative premises behind the politics.”1 But what if we 
take the political as the primary level and the normative as 
secondary, or derived from the political?
That is what we will try to do here, by introducing an 
alternative conceptualization of the political and hence free 
us from the “false dilemma” Ooms also wants to escape. 
“Although constructivists have emphasized how underlying 
normative structures constitute actors’ identities and 
interests, they have rarely treated these normative structures 
themselves as defined and infused by power, or emphasized 
how constitutive effects also are expressions of power.”2 This 
is the starting point for the political theorist Chantal Mouffe, 
and her response is to develop an ontological conception of 
the political, where “the political belongs to our ontological 
condition.”3 According to Mouffe, society is instituted 
through conflict. “[B]y ‘the political’ I mean the dimension of 
antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human societies, 
while by ‘politics’ I mean the et of pra tices and i stitutio s
throu h which an ord r is created, orga izing human
coexistence in th  context f conflictuality provi ed by the 
political.”3 An issue or a topic needs to be contested to become 
political, and such a contestation concerns public action and 
creates a ‘we’ and ‘they’ form of collective identification. But 
the fixation of social relations is partial and precarious, since 
antagonism is an ever present possibility. To politicize an issue 
and be able to mobilize support, one needs to represent the 
world in a conflictual manner “with opposed camps with 
which people can identify.”3 
Ooms uses the case of “increasing international aid spending 
on AIDS treatment” to illustrate his point.1 He frames the 
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raise some small-scale development funding (perhaps by 
investing in the venture themselves). They undertake initial 
proof-of-concept studies and secure a patent to protect their 
intellectual property. Believing (wrongly) that they are now 
nearing the end of the technology development process, they 
set up a company of which they are both co-directors. But 
they quickly discover that the path to “health” (for patients) 
and “wealth” (for themselves) is neither straight nor smooth. 
Their technology cannot be used on patients until it has met 
regulatory approvals; regulatory approvals require stringent 
tests of quality, safety and efficacy; those tests require 
substantial money; and money up-front requires a business 
plan and a plausible promise of return on investment. Our 
entrepreneur begins to learn the language of venture capital; 
he crafts a (fanciful, simplistic) narrative linking the clinical 
need (problem) with his technological innovation (solution) 
and sends it out to prospective investors. 
The investor in this drama is used to dealing with enthusiasts 
who do not understand financial markets or regulatory 
requirements. She knows that healthcare technologies often 
fail to fulfil their early promises but occasionally prove to be 
genuine (and profitable) breakthroughs. She is attracted to 
novel ideas and skilled in diversifying her portfolios so as to 
distribute risks. But her shareholders expect a good return 
within a few years. She will not put money into a venture 
solely on the basis of the latent (that is, tentative) value 
proposition expounded by the entrepreneur. She looks for 
objective data to estimate the size of the potential market and 
pace of development, and gauges what level of interest other 
investors are showing. She reads the business and financial 
media carefully. 
The business analyst (journalist, blogger etc) writes creatively 
for the investment market. Using a genre of writing that is 
unashamedly speculative and which some would describe as 
hyperbolic, he crafts a narrative that reframes the problem-
solution dyad in quantitative financial terms. This narrative 
emphasises four things: risk (if the condition remains 
untreated, there will be x amount of suffering, expense, 
litigation etc), efficiency (routine use of the technology will 
save y bed days, clinic visits, malpractice suits etc), profit (once 
the technology has been widely adopted, an annual return of 
$z is predicted) and trustworthiness (the company’s incoming 
chief executive has a strong track record of generating high 
returns in a related business). The purpose of this narrative 
is not to provide a detailed exposition of clinical need or 
an accurate estimate of benefit and harm but to engender 
sufficient interest (nay, excitement) from investors to attract 
an initial tranche of venture capital. Because investors’ unit 
of analysis is not the individual venture but the diversified 
portfolio, it helps to be as sensational as possible. Indeed, this 
is necessary because it helps to ensure that money flows in 
the direction of risky ventures, a tiny fraction of which will be 
highly successful.
On the basis of one such necessary fiction, our investor 
cautiously decides to finance our heroes’ venture. Before 
putting money on the table, she takes steps to “de-risk” it 
to increase the chances that it will generate an early return. 
The technology must be capable of being mass-produced 
and commercialised (that is, sold on as a viable business 
proposition). Nice-to-have but expensive-to-produce features 
must be pared back because they interfere with this goal. 
Otherwise, no deal. Our heroes are disappointed (they created 
all the bells and whistles and can justify their value, if not in 
financial terms), but they need the money so must accept a 
compromise. Lawyers are brought in to draw up contracts. 
Once a deal has been struck, the investor begins to coach 
and nurture our entrepreneur and his board of directors. 
They must learn to focus clearly on the point in the not-too-
distant future when the investment can be liquidated (eg, sold 
as shares) and its [financial] value realised. To that end, they 
must produce a revenue model (an account of how, when and 
to whom sales will occur), grow a value network (relationships 
with suppliers, distribution channels and competitors) and 
tighten every step in the value chain. Milestones, especially 
regulatory approval (which will enhance the venture’s 
economic and clinical value in the eyes of investors) must be 
explicit and measurable. If they slip, our hard-nosed investor 
will intervene actively to modify the business strategy and 
bring the venture back on [financial] course. Subsequent 
tranches of funding will be contingent on complying with 
such intervention. Thus, the idea becomes progressively more 
viable as a business venture – but, not uncommonly, loses 
features that cannot be quickly monetised.
There are multiple gatekeepers (sometimes known as 
regulators) in this story. One works for an institution that 
grants licences for the use of health technologies; his concern 
is the technology’s quality, safety and the basic “does it work?” 
efficacy question. Investors will ensure that early health 
technology appraisals are explicitly designed to provide 
precisely the information this regulator needs (no more, 
no less) to award the licence. Another gatekeeper works 
for a financial institution; her concern is the auditability 
of businesses. The investor will guide the venture to put in 
place whatever the financial gatekeeper needs to grant market 
clearance. 
The story thus far has articulated the supply side of the 
equation. Meanwhile, the healthcare policy-maker (who works 
in a different government department from the innovation 
policy-maker) and/or local purchaser are asking demand-side 
questions that reflect the (very different) priorities and values 
of health technology assessment (incidentally, we dispute 
Lehoux and colleagues’ use of the word “intrinsic” to describe 
these demand-side values: there are no a priori values). For 
which denominator populations will this technology bring 
benefit? What is the number needed to treat and number 
needed to harm for each sub-population (with confidence 
intervals please)? What alternative approaches (including 
doing nothing) are there, and how do their benefit-harm 
ratios compare? How affordable is this option given the 
overall health budget and opportunity costs? The evidence 
generated for regulatory approval is unlikely to address these 
questions unless they were anticipated and built in from the 
start. A new round of studies is commissioned (typically by a 
different agency), this time focusing on comparative and cost 
effectiveness. 
In this penultimate scene, let us introduce our final character: 
the patient. Far from being the star of the show, he has only 
a cameo (and, usually, non-speaking) part in the drama. He 
may have featured fleetingly in earlier acts as an anonymised 
“subject” in research trials and thence as a dot on a graph in 
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the appendix to a licence application. But what does he value? 
In what way is he ill (or at risk of illness) and what trade-
offs is he prepared to make to reduce his actual or potential 
suffering? Taking account of those trade-offs, to what extent 
does he consider the new technology desirable? Has anybody 
asked him – and even if they did, were his views incorporated 
in the series of non-linear decisions that followed? Yet 
depending on how supply-side and demand-side logics play 
out, his condition may soon come to be investigated or treated 
– and in some cases, defined and even brought into being – 
using the new technology. 
The best-case denouement of this drama is that despite the 
inherent malalignments in the system, a useful innovation 
still emerges, gains regulatory approval, gets taken up in 
practice to the benefit of patients and generates a profit for its 
developer and investors. But sometimes, because supply-side 
dynamics tend to distort and “freeze” the value of a health 
technology before the demand side gets a look-in, nobody 
gains. The patient does not gain (and may lose out) because 
the outcomes he values – and the trade-offs he considers 
worthwhile – never influenced the design or modification 
of the technology. The entrepreneur and bioengineer do not 
gain because the investors (and their lawyers) drove such a 
hard bargain that they will make little if any money when 
the venture is liquidated. Shareholders do not gain because 
despite gaining regulatory approval the venture never 
becomes viable (for example, because clinicians resist the 
new technology15 and/or the patient population that stands 
to benefit from it is too small to recoup production costs). 
The economy does not gain because the promise of highly-
skilled jobs and greater international competitiveness is never 
realised. The healthcare system does not gain because nothing 
gets produced that is better or cheaper than the existing care 
model for the target condition. 
Curtain.
Lehoux and colleagues’ account of health technology 
development resonates with previously published critiques 
of “irresponsible innovation” characterised by technology 
push, neglect of ethical principles, policy pull and lack of 
precautionary measures.16-19 We were, arguably, misled 
when governments wove together the terms “innovation,” 
“health” and “wealth” and implied that pursuit of the first 
would generate, inevitably and in parallel, the second two20-22; 
empirical evidence suggests it rarely does.23-27
We agree that current incentive and regulatory mechanisms 
are not supporting or rewarding the public goods that are 
needed in the health system. But we believe there is evidence 
that the research system is already playing a more significant 
role in the supply side of the equation than Lehoux and 
colleagues imply. If incentives were better aligned, universities 
could potentially become “lead actors” that could powerfully 
shape supply-side dynamics.28 
That said, there are also potential further misalignments 
between the research system and the health system that 
Lehoux et al have not explored, but which may be evident 
in their extensive dataset. For example, many academics 
consider that digital technologies should be tested using 
“gold standard” randomised trial methods, characterized by 
narrow research questions, pre-specified user groups and 
outcomes, procedural rigidity and efforts to “control out” 
the effects of material, social, and political context.29 Even if 
efficacy is demonstrated through such trials, the technology 
is likely to be obsolete by the time the findings are published 
and the political and purchasing realities that could stymie 
its adoption and spread in practice will have been overlooked 
– as illustrated by the UK’s multi-million pound ‘Whole 
Systems Demonstrator’ mega-trial of telehealth.30
Another apparent omission from Lehoux and colleagues’ 
empirical dataset is any direct capture of the patient voice, 
though they have previously demonstrated the importance 
of lay input in establishing the desirability (or not) of health 
technologies.5,7 Formal priority-setting partnerships such 
as the UK’s James Lind Alliance31,32 or public deliberation 
platforms18 are two contrasting approaches to gaining lay 
input to the research agenda, thereby potentially reducing 
waste.33 However, the conventional separation of “innovation” 
budgets from “research” budgets means that such approaches 
may have limited influence on technology start-ups. Our 
own ethnographic study of the priorities of older people for 
assisted living technologies found low levels of adoption and 
use (and, not uncommonly, active concealment or sabotage) 
of “innovative” technologies along with creative efforts 
by patients and their carers to build their own solutions 
by repurposing familiar technologies available within the 
home.34 
There is emerging (and reassuring) evidence of a radical 
change in the strategy taken by large technology companies 
to developing implementable and scalable technologies for 
healthcare. In our early fieldwork on electronic patient records 
and assisted living technologies (2005-2013), we observed a 
number of instances of aggressive marketing of off-the-shelf 
technologies to UK purchasers by leading suppliers.34,35 Many 
such technologies were sold through block contracts but only 
a fraction was ever used as they proved unfit for purpose 
and had not included a co-design element. Some companies 
developed a reputation for “shark” marketing tactics oriented 
towards gaining a short-term sale in the interest of maximizing 
profit. In the past three years, however, we have documented 
an increasing willingness by such companies to engage in 
long-term strategic partnerships with health and social care 
organisations, promote open standards, data exchange and 
interoperability in ways that facilitate collaboration across 
suppliers and increase potential for widespread adoption, 
undertake ethnographic studies and co-design projects, and 
hire clinical staff with extensive patient-facing experience 
(unpublished data from research interviews with executives 
from Microsoft, Tunstall and Philips). 
Various efforts have been made at policy level in different 
countries to better align the early research and development 
process with health needs. For example, the European 
Commission has developed special systems for funding, 
licensing and evaluating medicines for rare diseases, as well as 
advance purchase commitments for neglected diseases.36 But 
the exceptional nature of such arrangements highlights the 
challenges of trying to manage such an inherently complex 
system. In an era of increasingly complex inter-sectoral 
health research systems,37 there is an emerging evidence base 
(though no simple solutions) on how to govern and incentivise 
these “managed networks” to help align disparate goals and 
maximise value for all stakeholders.38,39 Some countries 
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have an independent “council for health” (for example, De 
Gezondheidsraad in the Netherlands) that is independent of 
government and operates in a neutral space to help facilitate 
the work of the multiple stakeholders and the interactions 
between them in a way that is clearly focused on maximising 
health gain. 
In conclusion, we concur with Lehoux et al that health 
technology development is not (and never will be) a smooth 
pipeline. We commend them for proposing an initial model 
for illustrating how the value proposition of a new technology 
is affected by both supply-side and demand-side influences 
(which are often poorly aligned). In this commentary, we 
have highlighted some additional influences (both positive 
and negative) that might need to be factored into this model. 
We have re-drawn Lehoux and colleagues’ model to embrace 
these additional influences and indicated where more 
strategically-directed research (of various kinds) might help 
to reduce misalignments and waste in the system (Figure). 
This model is by no means definitive and we look forward to 
further discussion and debate.
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